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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most contentious issues before the World Trade Organization ("WTO") is the application of the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("the TRIPS Agreement", "TRIPS", or "the Agreement") to WTO members seeking to
facilitate access to essential medicines. Members seek to use these
medicines to combat ongoing epidemics such as HIV/AIDS or sudden
threats such as the recent anthrax scares following the terrorist attacks
on the United States on September 11, 2001.
Developing countries have argued that the TRIPS Agreement
does not limit their sovereignty to address crises such as HIV/AIDS.
They view compulsory and parallel licensing as permissible objectives that do not violate the TRIPS Agreement. Developed countries,
particularly the United States and Switzerland, have argued that the
only flexibility in the TRIPS Agreement is the staggered implementation periods developing countries enjoy under the Agreement. Under
the staggered implementation schedule, developing countries have
five years and least developed countries have ten years from January
1, 1996, to fully implement the Agreement.
The November 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health ("the Doha Declaration") was in part necessitated by these
divergent perspectives. The WTO's dispute settlement bodies have
not directly addressed these divergent interpretations.1 In addition, the
legal effect of a unilateral interpretation of a treaty made by one of the
contracting states is not binding upon other contracting states.2 It is
therefore useful to examine the extent to which the Doha Declaration
resolves these divergent interpretations.
Under customary international law, treaty interpretation must be
based on the text, context, object and purpose, and good faith. Where
these methods do not result in a conclusive interpretation, supplementary bases of interpretation may be used. This Article argues that
given the divergent interpretations of the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha
Declaration should now be regarded as an interpretive element in the
1.WTO panel or appellate body reports "are not binding, except with respect to
resolving the particular dispute between the parties to that dispute.' WTO Appellate
Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R at 9 (Oct. 4,
1996). However, such reports could provide guidance to the WTO. See WVTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Tax Treatment For "ForeignSales Corporations,"
WT/DSI08/AB/R 115 at 31 (Feb. 24,2000).
2. BARON ARNoLD DuNcAN McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES BY LORD

MCNAIR 345-50 (1961).
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interpretation of the TRIPS agreement under customary international
law.
Part II outlines the rights of patent holders under the TRIPS
Agreement and the challenges posed by the ongoing HIV/AIDS pandemic. Part III discusses the negotiations leading to the Doha Declaration. Part IV examines the extent to which the Doha Declaration can
be construed as an element in the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement.
If.
PROTECTION OF PATENTS UNDER THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT AND THE HIV/AIDS PANDEMIC
The TRIPS Agreement is a product of protracted negotiations at
the Uruguay Round that ended in 1994. Like most General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT') rules, the negotiations leading to its
adoption were "long, unwieldy and exhausting... with substantive
negotiations separated by several years." 3 The difficulty of amending
GATT/WTO rules has resulted in an "additional complex of related
instruments" whose legal status is uncertain.4 The Doha Declaration
was necessary in part due to the
unwieldy legislative process sur5
rounding the TRIPS Agreement.
The TRIPS Agreement establishes patentability for product and
process inventions in all fields of technology, provided they are new,6
involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial application.
Patent rights must be available "without discrimination as to the place
of invention, the field of technology or whether the products are imported or locally produced." 7 The Agreement also guarantees most
favored nation treatment for intellectual property rights, and requires
members to "ensure that enforcement procedures.. .are available under
their law so as to permit effective action against any act of infringe-

3. See Kenneth W. Abbot, GATT as a PublicInstitution: The Uruguay Round and
Beyond, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 31, 83 (1992).
4. JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 26-30 (1990).
5. As Abbot observes, "[t]his kind of legislative process cannot hope to keep pace
with changes in practice and perception in the community at large, or to focus sufficient attention on the increasingly complex issues coming onto the international trade
agenda." Abbott, supra note 3, at 83.
6. See Art. 27(1) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
33 LL.M. 81, 108 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/tagme.htm.
7. Art. 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement.
8. See Art 4 (1) of the TRIPS Agreement provides that "[a]ny advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members."
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ment." 9 Members must ensure transparency by making their laws,
regulations, judicial decisions, and administrative rulings available in
a national language. 10 Disputes under the Agreement must be resolved
through the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding."
Under the earlier Paris Convention, each country was only
obliged to extend intellectual property protection no worse than its
own to its trading partners. 2 By requiring minimum levels of protection, the TRIPS Agreement therefore no longer allows countries to
choose their level of intellectual property protection.
During the Uruguay negotiations on the TRIPS Agreement, a major goal of the United States, the European Union, Japan, Switzerland,
and the Nordic countries was to establish a high level of intellectual
property protection with a guarantee of enforcement 13 Developing
countries, particularly Brazil, argued that this position focused too
much on the interests of owners of intellectual property rights and not
enough on those of users. Brazil argued that the Agreement should
reflect the needs of developing countries, such as access to technology. 14 During the Uruguay Round, the United States unilaterally pressured developing countries opposed to its negotiating position, such as
Brazil, Thailand, and India, using the authority of the United States
Trade Representative ("USTR") under super 301.15 Therefore, the
Agreement was negotiated within a coercive bargaining context, despite the fact that developing countries won some concessions in return for signing the TRIPS Agreement 6
The issue of access to essential medicines replays the original debate between developing and developed countries regarding the
TRIPS Agreement. Developed countries continue to maintain that
high levels of intellectual property protection provide the necessary
incentive for investment in research and development, which is the
best guarantee of access to essential medicines for all countries. In
contrast, developing countries maintain that strict constructions of the
TRIPS Agreement fail to recognize the legitimate interests of intellectual property rights users, especially in the context of crises such as
HIV/AIDS.
9. Art. 41(1). Under Articles 42 through 45, members must provide measures for
the preservation of evidence, as well as preliminary and injunctive relief and civil
damages.
10. See Art. 63(1) of the TRIPS Agreement.
11. See Art. 64 of the TRIPS Agreement.
12. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
21 U.S.T. 1583 (as revised on July 14, 1967 in Stockholm).
13. See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1994),
VOL. IV, PART 1478-79 (Terence P. Stewart, ed., 1999).
14.Seeid at 481.
15. See id at 495-514; see also infra note 114 and accompanying text.
16. See CHAKRAVARTM RAGHAVAN, RECOLONIZATION: GAIT, THE URUGUAY
ROUND & THE THIRD WORLD 69-80 (1990).
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Though HIV/AIDS is incurable, drugs have made it treatable. For
example, in the United States, retroviral drug treatment has quadrupled the median survival time for Americans diagnosed with
HIVIAIDS from one to four years.11 However, HIV/AIDS remains an
intractable problem, particularly in developing countries. In subSaharan Africa, over five million people have contracted the virus,
half of them between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four. Close to one
million of those infected are children. In the former Soviet Union,
there are over one million people infected with HIV/AIDS. In 2001,
an estimated 30,000 people in Western Europe and another 45,000 in
North America became infected. The economic and social impact of
the virus has been staggering, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.
Countries, inter-governmental institutions, and non-governmental
groups have designed and implemented programs to deliver a variety
of services to address this pandemic.'
Rather than presenting the TRIPS Agreement with new challenges, the HIV/AIDS pandemic re-created tensions between developing and developed countries already apparent at the Uruguay Round.
The tensions surrounding the Agreement are not merely between developing and developed countries. Tension also exists regarding the
*definition of an intellectual property right. If it is conceived in abstract
terms as an exclusive power that provides incentives to invest in research, this definition ignores the social context of these rights. 19 The
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health seeks to resolve this
tension.

17. See US. Study Finds AIDS PatientsSurviving Longer, CNN.COM, Mar. 14,
2001.
18. See Peter Pint, UNAIDS Executive Director, Testimony to the Hearing of the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate on Halting the Global
Spread of HIV/AIDS: The Future of U.S. Bilateral and Multilateral Responses (Feb.
13, 2002), at http://www.unaids.orgwhatsnew/speeches/eng/2002/PiotSenate_
130202.html.
19. Joseph Singer argues that property law is highly protective of the prerogatives
of owners, but it also recognizes that ownership may impose vulnerabilities on others
and limits the rights of owners when their actions impinge on the legitimate interests
of others. See JOSEPH SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON THE
OBLIGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP 20 (2000). See generally JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS,
SOFrWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION

SOCIETY (1996); Samuel K. Murumba, GlobalizingIntellectualProperty: Linkage and
the Challenge of a Justice Constituency, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 435 (1998); Ruth
G. Okediji, Towardan InternationalFair Use Doctrine,39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
75 (2000); GREGORY ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS
OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970 (1997).
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IH. NEGOTIATING THE DOHA DECLARATION
A. Events Leading to the Declaration
The TRIPS Council held a special session in June 2001 to discuss
the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement. The goal of this special
session was to define the relationship between intellectual property
rights and access to essential medicines under the Agreement. The
goal of the Africa Group and other developing countries was to clarify
the extent to which the TRIPS Agreement allows members to promote
and protect public health and "other overarching public policy objectives.

20

The Special TRIPS Council heard over forty statements during
the meeting on June 20, 2001. The United States argued that a strong
patent regime would produce benefits for all countries, while acknowledging the interests of developing countries in access to essential medicines. The European Community's ("E.C.") delegation welcomed the discussion as laying the ground for a fruitful process towards the Doha Ministerial conference. Developing countries continued to emphasize that restrictive interpretations of TRIPS would unduly limit their ability to address public health emergencies such as
AIDS.21
The joint developing country paper endorsed by the Africa

Group, the Association of South-East Asian Nations, Brazil, and others presented a common legal interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement.

The immediate challenge facing these countries is the need to lay a
legal basis for steps to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic without fear
of violating the TRIPS Agreement. This need for legal security is particularly urgent for countries of the Southern Africa region, where
HiIV/AIDS infection rates are near thirty percent of their populations.
South Africa argued that challenges to its public health legislation by
pharmaceutical companies necessitated legal certainty on the scope of
the TRIPS Agreement.
By contrast, the United States adopted the position that the TRIPS
Agreement strikes a balance between incentives for innovation and
access to essential medicines. According to the United States, the developing countries were mistaken to argue that Articles 7 and 8 of the
TRIPS Agreement are the backdrop against which the rest of the provisions of the Agreement should be read. Instead, the United States
argued that the TRIPS Agreement accommodated developing coun20 TRIPS and PublicHealth, submission of the Africa Group and other developing countries to the Special TRIPS Council Meeting of June 2001,
5, at
http://www.twnside.org.sgltitlettwrl3le.htm.
21. See Cecilia Oh, Developing Countries Callfor Action on TRIPS at Doha
WTO MinisterialConference, at http://www.twnside.org.sgltitle/twrl3 ld.htm.
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tries by allowing them longer transition periods for compliance. The
United States also argued that compulsory licensing under Article 31
should be read together with Article 27.1, which would prevent member countries from taking steps to protect public health and to ensure
their citizens' access to essential medicines.
In a follow-up informal meeting of the TRIPS Council on July 25,
2001, the United States and Switzerland declared that they would not
endorse any proposal at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha that
affirmed that the TRIPS Agreement permits countries to take measures to ensure access to essential medicines? 2 Developing countries,
led by the Africa Group, proposed six elements to be included in a
declaration to be issued at the Doha meeting:
(1) the use of Articles 7 and 8 in the interpretation of
all provisions in the TRIPS Agreement; (2) the right
of countries to determine the grounds on which compulsory licences may be issued; (3) recognition of
compulsory licences issued to a foreign manufacturer; (4) the right to parallel import; (5) a moratorium on all dispute actions aimed at preventing or
limiting access to medicines or protection of public
health; and (6) extension of transition periods
for de23
veloping and least developed countries.
The United States objected to a separate declaration, arguing that developing and least developed countries had not proven that the TRIPS
Agreement limited access to essential medicines.
The United States, E.C., and Switzerland further objected to any
discussions at the TRIPS Council of a moratorium on filing dispute
settlement actions. They argued that only the General Council had the
necessary mandate to discuss this "'political' issue." 24 At a General
Council meeting on July 26, 2001, the United States sought to limit
any link between TRIPS and public health to AIDS.2 5 The United
States also argued at the June 2001 TRIPS Council meeting that serious health problems like HIV/AIDS needed a "comprehensive approach," including medical infrastructure, doctors, nurses, and initiatives by multilateral institutions such as the World Health Organization.26 Developing countries replied that the TRIPS Council did not
22. See Cecilia Oh, US Opposed to Moves to Address Public-Health Concerns
About TRIPS, athttp://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twrl3lf.htm.
23. Id'
24. Id
25. See id
26. The Africa Group's Proposals, at http'//www.twnside.org.sg/title/twrl3lg.

HeinOnline -- 15 Harv. J. L. Tech 297 2001-2002

HarvardJournalofLaw & Technology

[Vol. is

have the mandate to27 consider domestic responses to AIDS or other
public health issues.
When the TRIPS Council met on September 19, 2001, it discussed two drafts of a proposed ministerial declaration. The developing country draft28 asserted that the TRIPS Agreement does not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health. Thus
TRIPS does not remove a member's sovereign power to address public health emergencies within its own borders. The developed country
draft argued that the most effective strategy for addressing public
health emergencies is a combination of economic, social and health
policies.29 These policies require a strong patent regime to encourage
the development of new drugs.
Notwithstanding these divergent positions, a Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health was issued by a consensus of all WTO
members at the Doha Ministerial meeting in Qatar in November 2001.
The Declaration provides in part:
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and
should not prevent members from taking measures to
protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating
our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm
that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and,
in particular,
30
to promote access to medicines for all.
The Declaration acknowledges that HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria,
and other epidemics are grave public health problems afflicting developing countries. It also reaffirms "the right of the WTO Members to
use, to the full, the provisions in
the TRIPS Agreement, which pro31
vide flexibility for this purpose."

27. See id
28. The group of developing countries included the African Group, Bangladesh,
Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras,
India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
and Venezuela. Draft Ministerial Declaration, Proposalfrom a Group of Developing
Countries, IP/ClW/312 (Oct. 4, 2001), available at http.//www.wto.org/english/ tratope/trips e/mindecdraftw312_e.htm.
29. The group of developed countries included Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States. See Draft Ministerial Declaration, Proposalfrona Group
of Developed Countries, IPICV/313 (Oct. 4, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/mindecdraft w313_e.htm.
30. Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(0l)/Dec/2
4 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration], available at http.//www.wto.org/
english/thewtoe/minist e/min0l e/mindeel trips e.pdf.
31. Id.
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IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE DOHA DECLARATION
The Doha Declaration was necessary because interpretation of
TRIPS based on the text, context, object and purpose, and good faith
did not settle divergent interpretations. My analysis of the legal status
of the Doha Declaration under international law discloses at least
three possibilities:
(1)
(2)
(3)

As a subsequent agreement under Article 31 § 3(a)
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties re32
garding the interpretation of the TRIPS agreement.
As evidence of subsequent practice establishing the
understanding of WTO members regarding interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement.33
As a declaration of commitment and intent that does
not constitute an enforceable legal obligation.

A treaty should be interpreted in good faith using the ordinary
meaning of its terms in context and in light of the treaty's object and
purpose.34 Text, context, object and purpose, and good faith are used
"'as one holistic rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order."35 Article 3.2 of the
WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding incorporates this rule by
requiring the dispute settlement panels to clarify WTO provisions "in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law." 36 Only where application of this rule results in ambiguity
can supplementary means of interpretation be used. Subsequent
agreements and practice are recognized supplementary
means of
37
treaty interpretation under customary international law.
32. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, § 3(a),
8 I.L.M. 679, 691-92 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
33. See Vienna Convention art. 31, § 3(b) at 692.
34. Vienna Convention art. 31, § 1 at 691-92; see also Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), 1994 LCJ. 6, 21-2 (Feb. 3); Oil Platforms (Islamic
Republic of Iran v United States ofAmerica), 1996 LCJ. 803, 812 (Dec. 12).
35. World Trade Organization Report of the Panel, United States-Sections 301310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R 7.22 (Dec. 22, 1999).
36. Art. 3(2) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS -

RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY

ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 112, 115 (1994). The Appellate Body has noted that it does
"not consider that Article 3.2 of the DSU is meant to encourage either panels or the
Appellate Body to 'make law' by clarifying existing provisions of WTO Agreement
outside the context of resolving a particular dispute." WTO Appellate Body Report,
UnitedStates-Shirtsand Blouses, WT/DS33/AB/R at 14 (May 23, 1997).
37. The International Court of Justice has recently treated Article 31 of the Vienna Convention as customary international law. See Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Narnibia), 1999 WL 1693057 18 (Dec. 13). Neither Botswana nor Namibia
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A. The DohaDeclarationas a Subsequent Agreement UnderArticle
31 § 3(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

Article 31 § 3(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that "any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions"
shall be considered together with its context in the interpretation of a
treaty.38 The International Law Commission has stated: "an agreement
as to the interpretation of a provision reached after the conclusion of
the treaty represents an authentic interpretation by the parties
39 which
must be read into the treaty for purposes of its interpretation.
Article 31 § 3(a) is useful to establish the intent of the parties to a
treaty where the text, context, object and purpose, and good faith are
incapable of resolving ambiguities. 40 Subsequent agreements reflect
the intent of the parties and can be used to interpret the actual terms of
the treaty."' Under recent WTO Appellate Body jurisprudence, there
is precedent for giving a subsequent agreement between parties to a
WTO treaty the same legal status as the WTO treaty.42
As described in Part III, the Doha Declaration was negotiated
over several months by all members of the WTO initially through the
TRIPS Council, which in turn made recommendations to the General
Council. The General Council then reported to the Ministerial Conference at Doha, which issued the Doha Declaration. The Ministerial
Conference has "the authority to take on decisions on all matters under any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements." 43 The Doha Declaration emerged from the WTO decision-making framework and was
issued by the Ministerial Conference at Doha. This is consistent with
were parties to the Vienna Convention but both of them considered Article 31 applicable "inasmuch as it reflects customary international law." Id. at 18. Similarly and
directly relevant, a WTO panel has also held that Article 31 has "attained the status of
rules of customary international law." UnitedStates-Sections301-310 of the Trade Act
of 1974, supra note 33, at 7.21.
38. Vienna Convention, art. 31, § 3(a) at 692.
39. Corfu Channel (Merits), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 25 (Apr. 9); Certain Expenses of the
United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2 of the Charter), 1962 I.C.J. 151, 157, 160-61,
172-75; Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), supranote 34, at 34-37.
40. Vienna Convention, supra note 36 and accompanying text.
41. Section 27 of Vice-President Weeramantry's dissenting opinion in Kasikili/Sedudu Island, supranote 37. The Appellate Body decision in JapaneseAlcohol
could be construed as an attempt to frame the disputed article as an agreement between
the parties relating to the treaty, and thus part of the context rather than of the treaty.
Robert Howse, Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International
Trade Law: The Early Years of WTO Jurisprudence,in THE EU, THE WTO, AND THE
NAFTA: TOwARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 59 (J.H.H. Weiler

ed., 2000).
42. Japan-Taxeson Alcoholic Beverages,supra note 1, at 24; see also Howse,
supranote 41.
43. Art. IV(l) of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
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the WTO's established practice of decision-making by consensus.
The various bodies of the WTO that negotiated the Doha Declaration
possessed institutional competence, and therefore the Declaration was
the result of the lawful process of negotiation and agreement that
characterizes the GATT/WTO.
Declarations negotiated through the legislative process of the
GATT/WTO have been used to interpret substantive provisions of
GATT/WTQ treaties. Paragraph 16 of the SingaporeMinisterialDeclaration,which summarized the 1996 Report of the Committee on the
Trade and the Environment,45 was issued at the conclusion of the
1996 WTO Ministerial Meeting in Singapore. The Appellate Body
used the Report in its Shrimp-Turtle decision to support its findings,
referrinn particular to the Report's emphasis on "multilateral solutions. This indicates that the Appellate Body viewed the Report as
a relevant interpretive tool.
1. The Declaration Proposes a Balancing Approach to Interpretation
of the TRIPS Agreement
The Doha Declaration captures the middle ground between the
positions adopted by developing and developed countries. It embodies
commitment to patent protection for the development of new drugs
and to availability of these drugs for indigent populations. The third
paragraph in the preamble to the Doha Declaration declares that "[w]e
recognize that intellectual property protection is important for the development of new medicines. We also recognize the concerns about
its effects on prices. '47 The fourth paragraph of the Declaration fortifies this middle ground by affirming that the "TRIPS Agreement can
and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of
WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to
promote access to medicines for all. ' 4S This language cast in terms of
members' rights to protect public health introduces an interpretation
not expressly provided in the TRIPS Agreement. Hence these rights
are not expressly derived from the TRIPS Agreement, but are exercis44. Art. IX(l) of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
1994. Art. IX(2) provides that the "Ministerial Conference and the General Council
shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of ... [WTO] Agreements." It
further provides that interpretations of WO Agreements such as TRIPS would be
made on the recommendation of the Council overseeing the implementation of that
Agreement.
45. Committee on Trade and the Environment, Report (1996) of the Committee
on Trade and Environment, WTICTE/1 (November 12, 1996).
46. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibitionof Certain
Shrimp andShrimpProducts,WT/DS58/AB/R at 50 (Oct. 12,1998).
47. Doha Declaration 3.
48. Doha Declaration 4.
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able in light of contemporary international
concern regarding the
49
HIV/AIDS pandemic, as discussed below.
The second part of the fourth paragraph further provides that in
"this connection, we affirm the right of WTO Members to use, to the
full, the provisions in the TRIPS .Agreement, which provide flexibility
for this purpose." 50 This statement is consistent with Appellate Body
jurisprudence construing exceptions to WTO commitments. The balancing test embodied in the Doha Declaration was embraced by the
Appellate Body in United States-Shrimp Products." In interpreting
the chapeau of GATT's Article XX, the Appellate Body held that "the
measures falling within the particular exceptions must be applied reasonably, with due regard to both parties.. .concerned. ' 2 In Hormones,
this balancing approach was adopted by the Appellate Body to reverse
53
a Panel decision on the burden of proof with regard to exceptions.
The Appellate Body held that "merely characterizing a treaty provision as an 'exception' does not by itself justify a 'stricter' or 'narrower' interpretation of that provision than would be warranted by
examination of the ordinary meaning of the actual treaty words,
54
viewed in context and in light of the treaty's object and purpose."
The Doha Declaration borrows its balancing approach from the jurisprudence on exceptions that has emerged from other WTO Agreements.
The chapeau of paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration embraces
this balancing approach because the members recognize a number of
flexibilities contained therein "while maintaining [their] commitments
in the TRIPS Agreement." These flexibilities include: reading each
provision of the TRIPS Agreement in light of the object and purpose
as expressed in its objectives and principles; 55 the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon
which such licenses are granted;55 the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency; 57 the freedom to establish their regimes of exhaustion without
49. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
50. Id.
51. United States-Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
supra note 46, at 42.
52. Id., quoting WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Gasoline,
WT/DS2/AB/R at 22 (May 20, 1996).
53. WTO Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R at 28 (Jan. 16, 1998). Notably, the Doha Declaration also shifts the burden on those countries that challenge another country's action taken to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic in accordance with the Doha Declaration.
54. Id.
55. Doha Declaration 5(a).
56. Doha Declaration 5(b).
57. Doha Declaration 5(c).
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challenge but subject to the MFN and national treatment provisions; 58
59
and extension of compliance periods for least developed countries.
2. Interpreting Specific Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement
The chapeau of Paragraph 5 presupposes that the four flexibilities
exist simultaneously with the rights and responsibilities embodied in
the TRIPS Agreement. Previous decisions have read the analogous
chapeau to Article XX of GATT to restrict exceptions to GATT.6 °
Recently, however, the Appellate Body has held that the object and
purpose of such a chapeau is to prevent abuse of the exceptions rather
than'to restrict them.6 Hence, to that extent, Paragraph 5 fortifies the
availability of the exceptions listed there to members pursuing public
health goals in the context of pandemics like AIDS. Furthermore, the
Appellate Body's dicta in United States-Shrimp Products supports
reading the TRIPS Agreement "in light of contemporary concerns of
the community of nations" when dealing with AIDS and similar
health pandemics such as tuberculosis and malaria.62

58. Doha Declaration 5(d).
59. Doha Declaration 7.
60. See, e.g., Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes, Report of the Panel (1990) 37 B.I.S.D. 200, available at
http:llwww.cptech.orglip/healtb/country/gatt-thai.html.
61. See United States-ImportProhibitionof Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, supra note 46, at 33. Further, the Appellate -Body has held that given two plausible interpretations of the obligations of a member, the less onerous or constraining
obligation should be adopted. See EC Measures ConcerningMeat and Meat Products
(Hormones), supra note 53 at 165.
62. United States - Import Prohibitionof CertainShrimp and Shrimp Products,
supra note 46, at 36. The Appellate Body referred to the protection and conservation
of the environment as contemporary concerns of the international community that
must be taken into account in interpreting the chapeau of Article XX of GATT. Furthermore, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice has argued that:
It is difficult to deny that the meaning of a treaty, or some part of
it (particularly in the case of certain kinds of treaties and conventions), may undergo a process of change or development in the
course of time. Where this occurs, it is the practice of the parties
in relation to the treaty that effects, and indeed is that change or
development.
GERALD FITZMAURICE, I THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUsTICE 359 (1986). However, the recent Appellate Body Report of the WTO in
Shrimp If indicates that an international consensus such as the one on preserving turtles as exhaustive resources can be used to legitimize unilateral sanctions. See B.S.
Chinni, WTO and Environment: Legitimisation of UnilateralTrade Santions, ECON.
& POL. WKLY., Jan. 12,2002, at 133-39.

HeinOnline -- 15 Harv. J. L. Tech 303 2001-2002

HarvardJournalofLaw & Technology

[Vol. 15

3. Interpreting the TRIPS Agreement in Light of Its Objectives and
Principles
The Doha Declaration supports reading all the provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement in light of Articles 7 and 8.63 This reading is further supported by the Appellate Body's reference to Articles 7 and 8
in Canada - Term of Patent Protection, even though neither party
specifically referred to these articles in establishing the panel and its
jurisdiction. The Appellate Body noted that its ruling did not in any
way prejudge "the applicability of Article 7 or Article 8 of the TRIPS
Agreement in possible future cases with respect to measures to promote the policy objectives of the WTO members that are set out in
those Articles. Those Articles still await appropriate interpretation....,m
This reading presupposes that the TRIPS Agreement balances
patent protection with access to pharmaceutical products in the context of WTO members facing public health emergencies. Access to
pharmaceutical products, however, is only one possible basis for such
an interpretation. Other bases could arguably include technology
transfers, preventing restraints of trade by patent owners, and linking

63. Articles 7 and 8 are, respectively, the objectives and principles clauses of the
TRIPS Agreement. Article 7 notes that:
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and
transfer and dissemination of technology to the mutual advantage
of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of
rights and responsibilities.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 7. Article 8(1) provides that:
Members may, in formulating their laws and regulations, adopt
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their
socio-economic and technological development, provided that
such measures are consistent with the provisions of this agreement.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 8. Article 8(2) provides that:
Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse
of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to
practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect
the international transfer of technology.
Id.
64. WTO Appellate Body Report, Canada - Term of Patent Protection, AB2000-7, WT/DS170/AB/R, at 101 (Sept. 18, 2000). This observation is consistent
with PatentProtectionfor Pharmaceuticaland AgriculturalProducts, where the Appellate Body noted that if a party does not introduce a claim in its terms of reference,
the claim cannot be adjudicated. See WTO Appellate Body Report, PatentProtection
for Pharmaceuticaland AgriculturalProducts,WT/DS50/AB/R, at
86, 88, 90, 92
and 96 (Dec. 19, 1997).
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working requirements to65the grant of patent rights under Article 8(2)
of the TRIPS Agreement
Interpreting the TRIPS Agreement in light of its principles and
objectives does not dictate any particular legal outcome. For example,
Articles 7 and 8 do not determine the balance between protection of
patent rights under Article 27.1 and the right to compulsory licensing
in pursuit of a public health program:
[W]hen one is dealing with the object and purpose of
a treaty, which is the most important part of the
treaty's context, the object and purpose does not
constitute an element independent of that context.
The object and purpose is not to be considered in isolation from the terms of the treaty; it is intrinsic to its
text. It follows that, under Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention, a treaty's object and purpose is to be
used only to clarify the text, not to provide independent
sources of meaning that contradict the clear
66
text.
What the Doha Declaration, however, does as a matter of law is
not insignificant. 67 It mandates reading the TRIPS Agreement in light
of its objectives and principles, thereby giving countries a legal basis
in the Agreement itself to argue in favor of public policies. For example, in the Arbitration Proceedings pursuant to Canada- PatentProtection of PharmaceuticalProducts (Generic Medicines), 8 Canada
argued that that it should have more time to comply with the repeal of
the stockpiling provisions in its Patent Act because of the political
sensitivity of reversing its "long standing policy of providing relatively low cost medication to consumers as soon as possible." The
Panel decision had required Canada to repeal statutory provisions that
65. The United States filed, but later withdrew, a WTO complaint against Brazil
asserting that the working requirement in Brazilian law was illegal under TRIPS. See
Peter Capella, Brazil Wins IV Drug Concession From US: Complaint to WTO on
PatentLaw Withdrawn,THE GUARDIAN, June 26,2001, at 18.
66. United States v. Iran, No. 130-A28-FT, 58 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 2000).
In the TRIPs context, see Abbott Frederick M., The TRIPS Agreement, Access to
Medicines and the WTO MinisterialDeclaration,5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 15

(2002).

67. See HENRY G. SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 610-12
(2d ed. 1980). Schermers discusses the legal effect of United Nations decisions, arguing that a decision does not have different legal effects when it is expressed as a 'declaration' rather than a 'resolution'.
68. Report of the Panel, Canada- Patent Protection ofPharmaceutcal Products,WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17,2000)
69. Robert L. Howse, The Canadian Generic Medicines Panel - A Dangerous
Precedentin Dangerous imes, 3 J. WORLD. INTELL. PROP. 495 (July 2000).

HeinOnline -- 15 Harv. J. L. Tech 305 2001-2002

HarvardJournalofLaw & Technology

[Vol. 15

allowed generic drug manufacturers to stockpile patent products prior
to the expiration of their patent term in readiness for marketing upon
the expiration of the patents. If the Panel had read this provision in
light of the TRIPS Agreement's objectives and principles, it might
have found in favor of Canada. Indeed, as Robert Howse has observed, the panel implausibly found the stockpiling provisions inconsistent with the TRIPS agreement while upholding the rights of competing generic manufacturers to test patented products prior to the
expiration of the period of protection." The Doha Declaration's exhortation that each provision of the TRIPS agreement be read in light
of the object and purpose as expressed in its objectives and principles
is therefore not inutile for countries in Canada's position. Similarly,
the United States7 was pursuing public health security goals when it
considered, but did not invoke, domestic legislation to override Cipro
patents during the anthrax scare. 72 The consideration of these goals by
a developed country in the context of anthrax lends legitimacy to
other countries' consideration of similar goals in the context of public
health emergencies such as AIDS.7 3 In this context, therefore, the
Declaration would preclude interpreting the obligations of the TRIPS
Agreement solely from the perspective of how the government's policies curtail right holders' interests and would permit consideration of
70. See id. at 498.
71. In the United States, compulsory licensing is not subject to exceptions as
those that encumber it in Article 31 of TRIPS. The U.S. government does not have to
seek a license or negotiate for use of a patent or copyright. Any federal employee can
use or authorize the use of a patent or a copyright under 28 U.S.C § 1498(a). The right
owner is entitled to compensation, but cannot enjoin the government or a third party
authorized by the government to prevent use. Use by any contractor, subcontractor,
person, firm, or corporation who receives authorization from the federal government to
use patents or copyrights is construed as use by the federal government, and cannot be
sued for infringement. Compensation is not based on lost profits or royalties, but rather
on reasonable royalty or, as one court has put it, since compensation is based on eminent domain, the proper measure is "what the owner has lost, not what the taker has
gained.' Leesona Corp. v United States, 599 F.2d. 958, 969 (Ct. Cl. 1979). This section explicitly provides that it shall not have extra-territorial effect.
72. See Paul Zielbauer, A Nation Challenged: The Latest Case; Connecticut
Woman, 94, Is Fifih From InhalationAnthrax, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at Al;
Timothy J. Burger, Feds Push Bayer to Boost Cipro Stociule, DAILY NEWS (New
York), Oct. 20, 2001, at 8; Geoff Dyer, et al., CanadaClimbs Down on Anthrax Drug,
FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 24,2001, at 4. The Bush administration has been criticized for failing
to invoke its authority to override the Cipro patent to facilitate stockpiling and affordable access. The government instead decided to negotiate a price cut. See Russell
Mokhiber & Robert Weissman, The Cipro Rip-Off and the Public Health (Nov. 8,
2001), athttp://www.counterpunch.org/mokhiber3.html.
73. According to the Executive-Director of UNAIDS, twenty million of the sixty
million people infected with HIV/AIDS in the first ten years of the epidemic are dead.
See Peter Piot, Testimony to the hearing of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
United States Senate on Halting the Global Spread of HIV/AIDS: the Future of U.S.
Bilateral and Multilateral Responses (Feb.
13, 2002) available at
http:llwww.unaids.orglwhatsnew/speecheslengl2OO2/PiotSenate.130202.html.
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how the policy safeguards consumers' interests in the provision of
low-cost essentials medicine during public health emergencies.
4. National Emergencies
The TRIPS Agreement does not define what constitutes a national
emergency or other circumstance of extreme urgency. The Doha Declaration does specify that HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other
epidemics are all instances of public health crises that can represent
national emergencies or other circumstances of extreme urgency. This
is a significant elaboration of Article 31, particularly in view of the
fact that at the pre-Doha negotiations, the United States had reluctantly indicated that only HIV/AIDS should qualify under the emergency criteria. 74 At the very least, for purposes of public health emergencies, the United States' pre-Declaration position (to the effect that
Article 31(b) rights are subject to Article 27.1 patent rights and adequate remuneration) can now safely be said to have been overcome.
Pursuant to the Declaration's exhortation that all provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement be read in light of its objectives and principles, it is
untenable to suggest that the invocation of compulsory licensing under Article 31 to address a public health emergency would necessarily
be overridden by the provisions of Article 27.1 on patent rights or
even the rights to normal exploitation and legitimate interests of patent owners referred to in Article 30.
According to the Kenya National AIDS HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan
2000-2005:
HIV/AIDS is a great threat to our nation. It has
caused deaths of over a million Kenyans since 1984.
There is yet no known cure, and we estimate that
over two million out of our total population of 29
million are living with HIV/AIDS. The rate of infection is rising and it is unlikely that an effective affordable cure or vaccine will be developed in the
near future. It is for these reasons that my Government declared HIV/AIDS a national disaster on 25
November 1999.75
The report details the impact of HIVY/AIDS on education, agriculture,
health, social services, the industrial sector, and the armed forces.

74. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
75. Daniel Amp Moi, Foreword to KENYA NATIONAL HIV/AIDS STRATEGIC
PLAN, 2000-2005, at ix (2000).
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The Kenya Industrial Property Act of 2001 waives the preconditions for providing compulsory licenses "in the case of a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, provided the
owner of the patent shall be so notified as soon as is reasonably practicable. ' 76 Issuing these compulsory licenses, then, would not violate
the TRIPS Agreement in light of the national AIDS emergency.
5. The Freedom to Establish Their Regimes of Exhaustion Without
Challenge but Subject to the MFN and National Treatment Provisions
Paragraph 5(d) of the Declaration provides that "the effect of the
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the exhaustion
of intellectual property rights is to leave each member free to establish
its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the
MFN and national treatment of Articles 3 and 4."
To what extent does the Doha Declaration clarify Article 6 of the
TRIPS Agreement regarding exhaustion of rights? 7 Article 6 provides that none of its provisions, except those dealing with nondiscrimination, national treatment, and most favored nation, can be
used to address the issue of exhaustion of intellectual property rights
in a WTO dispute. Exhaustion means that once a patent holder has
sold a patented invention, the patent holder has no further right to exclude others from subsequent use, including offering to sell or distribute the patented invention. In essence, exhaustion presupposes that the
patent owner, unless there is an agreement to the contrary, implicitly
licenses the subsequent use and resale of a patented product upon first
sale.
Since January 1, 1996, U.S. patent owners have had the right to
exclude others from offering to sell a patented invention in the United
States and from importing the invention into the United States.78
Hence under U.S. law, if a firm in a second country makes and sells a
U.S. patent owner's product and imports it into the United States, the
importation would constitute a violation of U.S. law. 79 If the product
76. Kenya Industrial Property Bill of 2001, § 74(2).
77. Article 6 provides that "[flor purposes of dispute settlement under this agreement, subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4, nothing in this Agreement shall be
used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights."
78. See 35 USC § 154(a)(1) (1999) & 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994). For an early
case, see Dunlop Co., Ltd. v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 484 F.2d 407 (6th Cir. 1973). See
also United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241,249 (1942).
79. See Boesch v. Grafl 133 U.S. 697 (1890). It is unclear though what the scope
of the national exhaustion as a norm under U.S. law is after the 1996 amendments.
However, prior to 1996, the law on exhaustion for United States patent rights
[m]ay occur if a sale in a foreign country is unrestricted and the
seller holds the patent rights to sell in the United States as well as
in the foreign country, but exhaustion will not occur if the person
owning or possessing license rights under the United States pat-

HeinOnline -- 15 Harv. J. L. Tech 308 2001-2002

No. 2]

Legal Status of the Doha Declaration

was under patent protection in the second country, that firm would be
in violation of the TRIPS Agreement. In the European Union ("EU"),
the sale of a patent license by the consent of the patent holder exhausts the patent holder's right to the good and the patent holder cannot oppose the use of it by others in subsequent transactions. However, the EU, like the United States, does not recognize international
exhaustion. Hence, if the sale is made outside of the EU and is subsequently distributed in the EU, the patent holders rights to control the
price or permit the licensee to sell it still exist.80 Both the EU and the
United States therefore have protectionist regimes that forestall competition from cheaper foreign manufacturers.
In contrast, developing countries maintain that they have a right
to determine whether or not to allow parallel imports. Unlike the
United States and the EU, they argue that patent holders should not
have the right to allow parallel imports. The Declaration is supportive
of every member of the WTO establishing their own regime of exhaustion as long as it complies with the non-discriminatory obligations of the TRIPS Agreement. This is a significant legal clarification
in view of pre-Doha controversies regarding the scope of a WTO
member's right to define its own regime of exhaustion. This clarifica-tion might result in a bifurcated regime of exhaustion among WTO
members. Countries seeking to promote public health programs such
as affordable medicines or access to essential drugs during a health
crisis might adopt an international exhaustion regime under which
right holders cannot take action against parallel imports. The right
established by the Declaration for countries to determine what constitutes a national emergency increases and strengthens sovereignty to
establish international exhaustion regimes. Once a country determines
that it faces a health emergency, it can then seek to import drugs from
another country where the right holder has licensed the drug. By contrast, countries with big pharmaceutical industries such as the United
States might seek to maintain their present regimes of exhaustion under which right holders can take action against parallel importers.
6. Extension of Compliance Periods for Least Developed Countries
Paragraph 7 of the Declaration provides a major concession to
least developed countries. Prior to Doha, the Agreement required
ent is not the same person who has made or authorized the sale
abroad.
5 DONALD S. CHIsUM, CHISUM ON PATENTs § 16.05[3][a][ii] (1999); see also Shubha
Ghosh, Pills, Patentsand Power: State Creationof Gray Markets As a Limit on Patent
Rights, 53 FLA. L. REv. 789 (2001).
80. See Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mb-, 1998 E.C.R. 1-4799 (1998).
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compliance from January 1, 2006.81 Now the least developed countries have until 2016 to come into compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. This ten year extension, without prejudice to these countries to
seek further extensions, only applies to pharmaceutical products, and
as such only delays implementation of Sections 5 and 7 of Part II of
the TRIPS Agreement.
B. The DohaDeclarationas Evidence ofSubsequent
PracticeUnder the TRIPSAgreement
Article 31 § 3(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties describes the role of subsequent practice in treaty interpretation:
"subsequent practice . . . establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation."8 2 The word "agreement" was included in
the final draft of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as a
replacement for the word "understanding" as a way of conforming the
English version of the treaty with the Spanish, Russian, and French
versions.8 3 Hence, the word "agreement" in the English text has the
same meaning as the French accord or the Spanish acuerdo; "agreement" includes both agreement in writing, such as the Doha Declaration, as well as agreement manifested by conduct, such as subsequent
practice. 84
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice has argued:
[T]he way in which the parties have actually conducted themselves in relation to the treaty affords legitimate evidence as to its correct interpretation....
81. Art. 66(1) of the Trips Agreement.
82. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, § 3(b), 8
I.L.M. 679, 691-2 (1969).
83. United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session, Vienna 26
March-24 May, at 442.
29, U.N. Doc A/CONF.39/11 (1968).
84. Sir Humphrey Waldock observed that the "word 'understanding' was chosen
by the Commission instead of 'agreement' expressly in order to indicate that the assent
of a party to the interpretation may be inferred from its reaction or absence of reaction
to the practice." Humphrey Waldock, Sixth Report on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/186 and Add. 1-7, 2 INT'L LAW COMM'N 51, 99 (1966). Similarly, the Court
of Arbitration in the Beagle Channel Arbitration observed:
[Tihe court cannot accept the contention that no subsequent conduct, including acts ofjurisdiction, can have probative value as a
subsidiary method of interpretation unless representing a formally
stated or acknowledged "agreement" between the Parties. The
terms of the Vienna Convention do not specify the ways in which
"agreement" may be manifested.
Case Concerning a Dispute Between Argentina and Chile Concerning the Beagle
Channel, 21 R.I.A.A. 55, 187 (1977).
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[C]onduct usually forms a more reliable guide to intention and purpose than anything to be found for instance in the preparatory work of the treaty, simply
because it has taken concrete and active, and not
merely verbal or paper, form. 5
For example, in a 1963 arbitration decision between the United States
and France, subsequent practice of the two parties was held relevant
to the interpretation of the governing 1946 treaty. Subsequent practice
was interpreted as tacit consent to modify the treaty "not by virtue of
the Agreement of 1946 but rather by virtue of an agreement that implicitly came into force at a later date."8 6 U.S. courts have also relied

on subsequent practice to interpret ambiguous treaty provisions. For
example, the Second Circuit has relied on subsequent conduct to find
that the term "accident" as used in the Warsaw Convention in the context of liability for aviation accidents includes hijackings.8 7 Therefore
consensus or common understanding between WTO members manifested by conduct can provide important guidelines on the interpretation and implementation of the words of the TRIPS Agreement.
The Doha Declaration evidences the embryonic stages of subsequent practice, which can therefore establish agreement of WTO
members regarding interpretation of specific provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement. As elucidated in Part III(a), the Doha Declaration allows
nations additional flexibility under TRIPS with regard to interpreting
TRIPS in light of its objectives and principles, granting compulsory
licenses, defining national emergencies, and establishing regimes of
exhaustion. To the extent these options under the Doha Declaration
are utilized by WTO members, they help constitute subsequent practice that can be used in interpreting the TRIPS Agreement.
Other decisions and policies adopted by WTO members may constitute subsequent practice under TRIPS. For example, the United
States withdrew a trade dispute filed under the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding against Brazil in 2000.88 The complaint in-

volved a Brazilian law that empowered the Brazilian government to

85. GERALD FrrZMAURICF, 1 THE LAw AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 357 (1986).

86. Decision of Arbitration Dispute Concerning International Air Transport Services Agreement (U.S. v. Fr.), 58 AM. J.INT'L L. 1016, 1023-1027 (1964).
87. See Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 351 F.Supp. 702 (D.C.N.Y.
1972); see also Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975);
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,

§ 325, Report-

ers' Note 5 (1987).

88. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. and
Brazil to Cooperate on HIV/AIDS and WTO Patent Dispute, (June 25, 2001) at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/ipripr-braziltrips.htn.
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grant compulsory licenses for failure to work patents it had granted.,3 9
Brazil argued that the law was necessary to encourage patent holders
to manufacture their drugs in Brazil at affordable prices and to facilitate technology transfer. The contemporaneous withdrawal of the
complaint with the commencement of the United Nations General
Assembly special session on HIV/AIDS and the TRIPS Council special session symbolized a movement towards balancing patent protection and health concerns. 90 Paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration acknowledges this balance by affirming the "commitment of developedcountry Members to provide incentives to their enterprises and institutions to promote and encourage technology transfer to least-developed
country Members pursuant to Article 66.2 [of TRIPS]." 91
A similar situation occurred with the South African Medicines
and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997, which
authorized the South African government to engage in compulsory
licensing to address their HIV/AIDS epidemic. 92 Promulgation of the
law concerned the United States Trade Representative ("USTR")
about possible violations of U.S. intellectual property rights and led to
the addition of South Africa to the USTR's watch list under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1 9 8 8.93 In addition, thirty89. WTO Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil- Measures Affecting
PatentProtection,WT/DS199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001).
90. See Peter Capella, Brazil Wins HIV DrugConcession From US: Complaint to
V/TO on Patent Law Withdrawn, GUARDIAN, June 26, 2001, at 18. On August 17,
2000, the UN Subcommission for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights
adopted a resolution on "Intellectual Property and Human Rights" that asserted the
primacy of human rights over intellectual property rights. See Intellectual Property
and Human Rights, Sub-commission on Human Rights Resolution 2000/21, Aug. 16,
2001.
91. WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Doha, 9-14 November 2001,
Declarationon the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC2, at 7
(Nov. 20,2001); see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 66.2, at 108.
92. Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965 After Amendment by the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 90 of 1997
(S. Afr.); see also Zackie Achmat, We Can Use Compulsory Licensing and Parallel
Imports: A South African Case Study, at http:llwww.hri.calpartnersalp/
tac/license.shtml; Anthony Stoppard, Health-South Africa: Drug Companies Drop
Lawsuit Against Government, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 19, 2001, available at
http://www.aegis.com/news/ips/2001/IP010413.html.
93. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 § 1303(b), 19 U.S.C.
§ 2242(a)-(b) (1999). Under this section, the United States Trade Representative
("USTR") is required within thirty days after the submission of the annual National
Trade Estimates (foreign trade barriers) to report to Congress those foreign countries
that (1) deny adequate and effective protection of U.S. intellectual property rights and
(2) those countries under (1) that are determined by the USTR to be priority foreign
countries. The USTR identifies as priorities only those countries that have the most
onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices that have the greatest adverse impact
on the relevant United States products and that are not entering good faith negotiations
or making significant progress in bilateral and multilateral negotiations to provide
adequate and effective intellectual property rights protection. Id.
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nine pharmaceutical companies filed suit in South Africa challenging
the law as being inconsistent with South Africa's obligations under
the TRIPS Agreement. 94 The United States eventually withdrew
South Africa from the watch list, but noted that the withdrawal was
not a recognition of the legitimacy of compulsory licensing. 5 Subsequently, the pharmaceutical com6panies withdrew their suits against
the South African government.9 Mike Moore, the WTO DirectorGeneral, noted upon settlement of the suits: "The settlement shows
that the WTO's Agreements, such as TRIPS, contain the necessary
flexibility to meet the health needs of developing countries and can be
used as a basis for resolving difficult issues concerning access to essential drugs." 97 These bilateral negotiations and decisions have precedential value in establishing the understanding of states regarding
the flexibility of the TRIPS Agreement.
Additional policy responses demonstrate an understanding of the
need to balance patent protection with the access to essential medicines. For example, Executive Order 13,155, signed by President
Clinton in May 2000 ordered the USTR not to impose trade sanctions
as it had done with South Africa. 98 In December 2001, the House
passed HR 2069, Global Access HI-V/AIDS Prevention, Awareness,
Education, and Treatment Act of 2001, which authorized appropriations of $750 million toward the GlobalAlDS and TuberculosisRelief
Act of 2000 and $50 million for the procurement and distribution of
HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals for developing countries. 9

94. See Simon Barber, US Remains Hostile-toSouth Africa Drugs Act, Bus. DAY,
Sept. 27, 1999, at 4.
95. See Press Release, Department of Trade and Industry, Joint Understanding
Between the Governments of South Africa and the United States of America (Sept. 17,
1999), at http'J/www.polity.org.zalpovdocsfpr/1999/pro9176.htnl; see also Barber,
supra note 94, at 4; Black Radical Congress, Activists Lock Gore Out of His Office,
CriticizingSA AIDS Drugs Deal,APM NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 25, 1999.
96. See Stoppard, supra note 92.
97. Mike Moore, Moore Welcomes News of Settlement of South Africa Drug
Lawsuit, (Apr. 19, 2001), at http://www.wto.orgenglish/newsespmm-e
spmm58_e.httm
98. See Exec. Order No. 13,155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,521, 30,522 (May 10, 2000).
This Executive Order also required sub-Saharan African countries to provide adequate
and effective intellectual property protection as a precondition for increasing access to
HIV/AIDS drugs. In February 2001, Joseph Papovich, the U.S. Trade Representative
for Intellectual Property Rights, stated that President Bush was "not considering a
change in the present 'flexible policy' on compulsory licensing of drugs by AIDSstricken countries." GRAEME DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 436 (2001).
99. See Global Access to HIV/AIDS Prevention, Awareness, Education, and
Treatment Act of 2001, H.R. 2069, 107th Cong., §§ 4(a)-(c), 7.
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C. The DohaDeclarationas a Legally Non-Binding
Statement ofIntent and Commitment
The Doha Declaration's legally binding status depends on the circumstances in which it was formulated, specific wording, subject matter, and the degree of support. 100 For example, although United Nations General Assembly decisions do not necessarily create law, they
assist in the evolution and consolidation of the law.10 1 Where a vast
majority of states signify their acceptance to a declaration, this can be
equivalent to codification of customary international law. 0 2 Sometimes, United Nations General Assembly decisions become customary
law as a result of subsequent state practice.1°3 Not a single WTO
member dissented from or abstained from voting for the Doha Declaration. This stands in contrast to the responses of developed countries
to the contentious attempts by developing countries in the 1960s and
1970s to use UN General Assembly declarations and resolutions to
reform aspects of international law. 10 4 Even if a country concluded
that the Doha Declaration is not legally binding, it still constitutes soft
law with substantial hortatory authority that puts political
pressure on
05
governments and intemational institutions to comply.

100. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (4th
ed. 1990); Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources ofHuman Rights Law: Custom,
Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82 (1992); OSCAR
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 85 (1991); ANTHONY
AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 26-46 (2000).

101. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276, 1971 I.CJ. 16, 31 (June 21) (referring to the UN General Assembly declarations
on self-determination and independence of peoples in territories that have not yet attained independence as having legal effect); see also Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 23-35 (Oct. 16); Louis B. Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Protection of the Rights of IndividualsRather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 16 (1982).
102. See Schermers, supra note 66, at 612. Schermers also notes that "[n]o constitution of an international organization refers to declarations as a separate class of
decision. No constitution expressly empowers an organization to issue declarations.
But this does not necessarily prevent organs from doing so." Id. at 611.
103. See OBED AsAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 47 (1966).
104. See generallyInternational Arbitral Tribunal: Award on the Merits in Dispute Between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company/California Asiatic Oil Company
and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (Compensation for Nationalized
Property), 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978).
105. U.S. practice under the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law dictates:
International organizations generally have no authority to make
law, and their determinations of law ordinarily have no special
weight, but their declaratory pronouncements provide some evidence of what the states voting for it regard the law to be. The
evidentiary value of such resolutions is variable. Resolutions of
universal international organizations, if not controversial and if

HeinOnline -- 15 Harv. J. L. Tech 314 2001-2002

No. 2]

LegalStatus of the Doha Declaration

The United States has maintained that Doha was a political declaration with no legal authority. The United States Trade Representative's Fact Sheet summarizing the results of the Doha meeting refers
to the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health as a political
declaration. 1°6 From this perspective, the Declaration is not a fait accompli for countries seeking to facilitate access to essential medicines. Rather, it is an implicit reciprocation by the West to developing
country governments for their implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and their acquiescence to a new round of WTO talks. 10 7 The
United States in particular would have been unwilling to sign the Declaration had it suspended the legal obligations of developing countries
under TRIPS.
Distinguishing legal claims from non-legal or political claims,
such as access to essential medicines, can deprive them of their status
as rights and thereby serve to legitimize an unjust status quo. As
Richard Bilder argued more than three decades ago, "[t]o assert that a
particular social claim is a human right is to vest it emotionally and
morally with an especially high order of legitimacy."10 8 Asserting that
a particular claim is not a right not only denies disempowered peoples
the potentially transformative value of rights, 10 9 but also robs their
claims of legitimacy in the moral currency of international relations.110 This denial results from the conceptualization of certain
claims as political, social, or public, so that as a result they fall outside
and cannot disturb the private commercial or contractual character of
trade, financial, or banking regimes.' For example, the Second Ciradopted by consensus or virtual unanimity, are given substantial
weight.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 103

cmt. c (1987; see also James T. Gathii, Good Governance as a Counter Insurgency
Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social Projects in InternationalLaw, 5
BuFF. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 65, 117-20 (1999); Voting Procedure on Question Relating
to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory of South-West Africa, Advisory
Opinion, 1955 I.C.J. 67, 118-20 (June 7) (separate opinion of Judge Hersch Lauterpacht); FITZMAURICE, supra note 85, at 431-32.
106. See Text: USTR Fact Sheet Summarizing Results from WTO Doha Meeting, Nov. 15,2001, at http://www.usembassy.it/file200_ll 1/alia/al 111516.htm.
107. See James T. Gathii, WTO Spin Unconvincing,AFRICAN BuS., Jan. 1, 2002,
at 5.
108. Richard Bilder, Rethinking InternationalHuman Rights: Some Basic Questions, 1 WIS. L. R.171, 174 (1969).
109. See KIMBERL. CRENSHAW ET.AL., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT

xxxii (Kimberle Crenshaw ed., 1995).

110. See Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J.INT'L L.

589 (1996).
111. Sde generally James T. Gathii, Re-characterizingthe Social in the Constitutionalizationof the WTO: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J., 137, 16473 (Spring 2001); James T. Gathii, Neo-Liberalism, Colonialism and International
Governance: Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy, 98
MICH. L. REV. 1996, 2027-34 (2000); James T. Gathii, ConstruingIntellectualProp-
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cut has held that debt restructuring plans between a country indebted
to Western financial institutions do not override the underlying contractual obligations to repay the debt.1 2 As a result, Costa Rica's
commitment to a debt restructuring plan under the supervision of the
International Monetary Fund was dubbed a political issue, rather than
13
a legal issue, to give the country time to meet its commitments.1
This outcome is typical where issues between developed and developing countries are examined through a commercial lens.
Not surprisingly, the Declaration does not override existing
United States laws that precondition continuation of assistance on
developing country protection of U.S. patents. This is because developing countries failed to win the guarantee that they could adopt
measures such as compulsory and parallel licensing to address the
AIDS pandemic without fear of bilateral pressures being applied
against them. Under the notorious unilateral powers dubbed section
3011 4 that were recently upheld by a WTO panel, the USTR is required to report measures taken to ensure protection of U.S. intellectual property rights through imposition of retaliatory tariffs. Under
this decision, the respect of developing countries for U.S. patents can
still be enforced
outside the WTO's Doha Declaration and TRIPS
15
Agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
By exhorting WTO members to construe all provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement in light of its objectives and principles clauses, the
Doha Declaration sets an interpretive baseline that requires balancing
the interests of producers and consumers of intellectual property
rights. That baseline forestalls a construction of the TRIPS Agreement
biased either in favor or against any of these contending positions,
thereby laying down a framework for a more fair determination of the
conflicting interests in the TRIPS Agreement. This framework does
not guarantee a particular result in any case. However, if the Doha
Declaration is taken as an element in the interpretation of the TRIPS
Agreement, and WTO members choose to accommodate each other
erty Rights and Competition Policy Consistently With FacilitatingAccess to Afford-

able Aids Drugs to Low-End Consumers, 53 FLA. L. REV. 728, 737-53 (2001).
112. See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola De Cartago, 757 F.2d. 516,
cert denied, 473 U.S. 934 (1985)
113. Id.; see also Elliot Associates L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363 (2d
Cir. 1999).
114. Trade Act of 1974, tit. II, ch. 1, § 301, 19 U.S.C. §241 1(a)(1), amendedby
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 1303(b).
115. See James T. Gathii, Re-characterizingthe Social in the Constitutionaliza-

tion of the WTO: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 137, 152-53, 16364 (Spring 2001). For the recent Section 301 panel decision, see supranote 35.
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on a case by case basis as they address public health crises, the declaration might build a more stable and perhaps fair legal framework.
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